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Franklin Savings v. Office of Thrift 
Supervision: A Case of Judicial Interpretation 
Creating a Due Process Dragon 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The recent savings and loan (S&L) crisis has brought to 
light many interesting and important issues concerning the 
interpretation and application of remedial statutes. Congress 
and the Judiciary have attempted to act swiftly and careful-
ly to remedy the mistakes of the past. Some new mistakes 
are being made, however, in the rush to put this problem 
behind us. This note will look at one such mistake: an 
interpretation of the "upon the merits" language found in 
section 1464(d)(2)(E) of the Home Owner's Loan Act (HOLA), 
as amended by the Financial Institution Reform, Recovery, 
and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA). The history of the 
S&L crisis will be briefly outlined, and then particular at-
tention will be given to the case of Franklin Savings Ass'n. 
v. Director of Office of Thrift Supervision 1• The district 
court and Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decisions in 
Franklin will be analyzed, as well as decisions by other 
courts interpreting the same "upon the merits" language. A 
final analysis of what Congress meant by "upon the merits" 
will then be made. 
A. History and Background of S&L Fiasco 
By the late 1980s, the savings and loan cns1s was a 
part of the daily vocabulary of nearly every American. This 
crisis did not spring up overnight, however. Indeed, it had a 
rather long and eventful history, a history spanning de-
cades.2 The bottom-line cause of the crisis was the inability 
of savings and loans to make a profit when the interest 
rates they were charging on long term mortgages fell short 
of the average cost of funds to the institution.3 
In an attempt to help the endangered savings and loan 
industry, Congress passed the Garn-St. Germain Depository 
1. 742 F. Supp. 1089 (D. Kan. 1990), rev'd, 934 F.2d 1127 (lOth Cir. 1991), 
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1475 (1992). 
2. For an extended look at the history of the Savings and Loan Crisis, see 
Carl Felsenfeld, The Savin{-is and Loan Crisis, 59 FORDHAM L. REVIEW 87 (May 
1991). 
3. ld. 
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Institutions Act of 1982,4 allowing S&L's to "explore new 
areas, both on the liability and asset sides."5 Such explora-
tion frequently proved dangerous and catastrophic. Interest 
rates rose, the real estate market fell, and the S&Ls used 
their newly given powers less-than-wisely. These factors, 
combined with regulators exercising their now-taboo forbear-
ance,6 created a disaster with an actual cost that could ex-
ceed one trillion dollars. 7 
In response to the S&L crisis, Congress enacted the 
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act 
of 1989 (FIRREA).8 Among the purposes for FIRREA were 
the following: 
To curtail investments and other activities of savings 
associations that pose unacceptable risks to the Federal 
deposit insurance funds. 
To put the Federal deposit insurance funds on a 
sound financial footing. 
To strengthen the enforcement powers of Federal regu-
lators of depository institutions. 
[and] 
To strengthen the civil sanctions and criminal penal-
ties for defrauding or otherwise damaging depository insti-
tutions and their depositors. 9 
FIRREA disposed of the Federal Savings and Loan In-
surance Corporation (FSLIC)10 and created both the Office 
of Thrift Supervision (OTS), which is under the supervisiOn 
of the Secretary of the Treasury, 11 and the Resolution 
4. Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 226 
(1988)). 
5. Felsenfeld, supra note 2, at S23. 
6. ld. at S28. Forbearance is a policy previously used by the Federal Home 
Loan Bank Board and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation that 
enabled struggling thrifts to remain open. 
7. G. Christian Hill, A Never Ending Story: An Introduction to the S&L Sym-
posium, STAN. L. & POL 'y REV. 21, 24. (Spring 1990). Given the delays currently 
being experienced in Resolution Trust Corporation funding and the resulting 
claimed daily loss of two million dollars, the total cost could be even higher. 
8. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (19R9)). 
9. ld. at 103 Stat. 187. 
10. FIRREA, Pub. L. No. 101-73 §703(a), 103 Stat. 415 (1989). 
11. 12 U.S.C. § 1462a (Supp. 1992). 
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Trust Corporation, (RTC)/2 a temporary agency, with 
scheduled termination on December 31, 1996.13 
One of the responsibilities of the OTS is to serve as the 
"teeth" of FIRREA. The OTS has the obligation and authori-
ty to place a non-compliant institution into conservator-
ship, 14 thereby severing the rights of the former owners 
and directors of the institution. 15 This power, although es-
sential to the proper regulation of the S&L industry, is 
nonetheless potentially destructive without sufficient limita-
tions. Enter Franklin Savings. 
II. STORY OF FRANKLIN SAVINGS 
A. Facts 
Franklin Savings was a century-old savings and loan 
institution, with principal offices in Ottawa, Kansas. 16 With 
approximately nine billion dollars in assets, it had achieved 
very high ratings for overall safety and soundness. 17 It in-
vested primarily in securities guaranteed by the federal 
government and developed a balanced portfolio in order to 
minimize the impact of interest rate fluctuations. 18 
Franklin was solvent, profitable, and compliant with all 
capital requirements imposed by FIRREA. 19 However, due 
to accounting write-downs imposed by the OTS,20 the Di-
rector of the OTS saw fit to appoint the RTC as conservator 
of Franklin Savings on February 15, 1990.21 The seizure 
was premised on the finding that the Association was "in 
12. !d. § 1441a(b)(l)(A). 
13. !d. § 1441a(o)(1). 
14. !d. § 1464(d)(2)(A). 
15. !d. § 1464(d)(2)(E). Tbe effect of the appointment of a conservator is much 
more than the mere loss of control to the directors. It has been estimated that 
when a bank is closed, the value of its assets drops from 10% to 15%. William 
Seidman, The Facts About the FDIC, WALL ST. J., June 5, 1991, at A12. 
16. Franklin, 742 F. Supp. at 1099. For an in-depth review of the proceedings 
from an insider's point of view, see Ernest M. Fleischer, Back off Feds, Bus. L. 
TODAY, May/June 1992, at 28. 
17. Franklin Savings Association and Franklin Savings Corporation's Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari, p.4.; Franklin, 742 F. Supp. at 1104. 
18. Franklin, 742 F. Supp. at 1099. 
19. !d. at 1110. 
20. Write-downs are accounting tools used by the OTS when it feels an institu-
tion has overstated its assets. The district court found that these write-downs were 
imposed "arbitrarily and capriciously." !d. 
21. !d. at 1099. 
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an unsafe and unsound condition to transact business."22 
As provided for by statute,23 Franklin responded within 
30 days of the seizure with an action in district court seek-
ing removal of the conservator.24 The Director of OTS then 
submitted a copy of the "designated record" to the district 
court and to Franklin.25 The "designated record" consisted 
solely of material selected by the OTS for submission.26 No 
opportunity was given to Franklin to participate in the 
compilation of this information, or to challenge the record's 
contents. 
B. Trial Court Decision 
In its analysis of the case, the Kansas District Court 
first determined the appropriate standard of review. The 
district court, finding no guidance in the statute with re-
spect to the proper standard of review, looked to the Ad-
ministrative Procedures Ace7 for direction. The standard of 
review found appropriate under that act required agency 
action to be set aside only if the action was "'arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accor-
dance with the law' or if the action failed to meet constitu-
tional, statutory, or procedural requirements.'>28 
The court placed the burden of proof on Franklin Sav-
ings as the party attacking the agency action,29 and then 
proceeded to determine the scope of evidence to be consid-
ered. The OTS consistently argued that the only evidence 
which could be considered was the administrative record 
22. ld. at 1106. The trial court found it significant that the same FHLBB-Tope-
ka staff which was involved in Franklin Savings was highly criticized for its prior 
handling of the Silverado Savings and Loan, and were "informed by Chairman 
Danny Wall that their jobs were in jeopardy if their performance did not improve." 
!d. 
23. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(2)(E)(Supp. 1992). 
24. It may be noted that the judge assigned to the case, Judge Dale E. Saffcls, 
was once president of the Federal Home Loan Bank of Topeka,· Kansas, and 
therefore had a good deal of knowledge concerning bank operations and regulation. 
2fl. Franklin, 742 F. Supp. at 1096, 1098. 
26. ld. The district court noted specific documents missing from the "designated 
record," including correspondence from Franklin responding to OTS allegations, and 
notes from meetings between Franklin and OTS. 
27. n U.S.C. § 706 (1977). 
28. Franklin, 742 F. Supp. at 1095 (citing the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A),(B),(C),(D) (1977)). 
29. ld. at 1096. 
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which it had prepared and filed with the court. 30 In con-
trast, Franklin argued that the court should consider evi-
dence outside of this record in determining the appropriate-
ness of OTS actions.31 
The court received evidence outside of the administra-
tive record, and took the question under advisement. The 
court found that evidence outside of the administrative re-
cord was appropriate for consideration. In support of this 
position, the court cited FIRREA's mandate that the court 
review the agency action "upon the merits."32 The district 
court found that courts were divided on the correct inter-
pretation of the "upon the merits" language. Some courts 
hold that the phrase only allows for a review of the admin-
istrative record. 33 In contrast, others hold that de novo re-
view is appropriate,34 while still others hold that a hybrid 
was required with the arbitrary and capricious standard 
applied to an expanded evidence base consisting of more 
than thf administrative record.35 
The district court found the expanded evidence base 
approach more correct, stating that: 
To allow the government to seize control of plaintiffs' busi-
ness and assets in an ex parte nature without a previous 
adversarial hearing would deny plaintiffs any meaningful 
opportunity to present their position. The court finds that 
to allow this sort of seizure of property without at least 
allowing plaintiffs a post-seizure opportunity to present evi-
dence supporting their case in opposition of the conserva-
torship, would definitely raise serious constitutional due 
process concerns. 36 
The court then chose to interpret the language of 
30. !d. 
31. ld. 
32. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(2)(E) (Supp. 1992). 
33. Franklin, 742 F. Supp. at 1096 (citing Woods v. Federal Home Loan Bank 
Bd., 826 F.2d 1400, 1406-07 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 959 (1988); 
Guaranty Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 794 F.2d 1339, 
1342 (8th Cir.1986)). 
34. ld. at 1096 (citing Fidelity Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank 
Bd., 540 F. Supp. 1374, 1;~77 (N.D. Cal. 1982); Telegraph Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. 
Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 564 F. Supp. 862, 869-70 (N.D. Ill. 1981)). 
35. ld. (citing Collie v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 642 F. Supp. 1147, 1150-
52 (N.D. Ill. 1986)). 
36. ld. at 1097. 
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FIRREA so as to allow it to withstand such a constitutional 
due process attack. It found that the ex parte seizure pro-
cedure was required "in light of the necessity that the regu-
lator must act quickly and decisively in reorganizing, operat-
ing and dissolving failed institutions."37 It found, however, 
that this procedure could only withstand constitutional chal-
lenge if the "upon the merits" language was interpreted to 
allow post-seizure presentation of evidence by the institu-
tion.38 
The district court further buttressed its position by 
citing a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision defining the 
administrative record as follows: 
[The Administrative record is] . . . not necessarily 
those documents that the agency has compiled and sub-
mitted as the "administrative record." The whole admin-
istrative record, therefore, consists of all documents and 
materials directly or indirectly considered by the agency 
decision-makers and includes evidence contrary to the 
agency's position.39 
The district court also held that evidence outside of the 
administrative record was necessary to understand the tech-
nical nature of the case,40 and to aid in the interpretation 
of regulations. 41 It concluded that the administrative record 
supplied by the OTS was a "selective compilation", and did 
not contain all documents and materials considered by the 
OTS in making their decision to appoint a conservator.42 
The district court, after considering all of the evidence 
presented, found that the OTS regulators involved "appeared 
to lack adequate training and understanding to evaluate the 
nature of Franklin's operation."43 The court held that "no 
statutory ground for the imposition of a conservatorship 
existed and ... [that] the OTS's action in imposing the 
RTC as conservator lacked any basis in fact and was arbi-
37. ld. (citation omitted). 
38. ld. 
39. !d. at 1097-98 (emphasis added) (quoting Thompson v. United States Dep't 
of Labor, 885 F.2d 551, fififi (9th Cir. 1989)). 
40. ld. at 1098. 
41. ld. 
42. ld. 
43. ld. at 1106. 
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trary and capricious . . . ."44 
C. Tenth Circuit Decision 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir-
cuit disregarded the experienced and well-reasoned analysis 
of the trial court judge and reversed. It found that FIRREA 
granted extremely broad powers to the director of the OTS 
including the power to appoint a conservator "if, in his [the 
director's] opinion, a statutory ground for the appointment 
exists."45 The court of appeals, quoting Webster's dictionary, 
stated that an opinion was "a belief held with confidence, 
not substantiated by direct proof or knowledge."46 It went 
on to find that Congress intended to give the director broad 
powers to act on opinion and expertise. According to the 
court, Congress wanted to prevent potential losses to tax-
payers by giving the OTS the power of swift and responsive 
action against mismanaged Ravings institutions.47 Such dis-
cretion, according to the court, mandates a limited scope of 
review. 48 
This review, according to the Tenth Circuit, was limited 
to the administrative record alone. 49 The court decided that 
evidence outside the administrative record could be consid-
ered only in specific instances, such as where the record 
fails to disclose the factors relied upon by the agency,50 
where background information is necessary for a determina-
tion of whether the agency considered all relevant factors,51 
or where necessary to explain technical terms.52 
This discretion allows the Director of the Office of 
Thrift Supervision powers heretofore forbidden any govern-
ment agent. It allows the director to take government action 
on little more than a whim, requiring no knowledge or 
44. !d. at 1127. 
4n. Franklin Sav. Ass'n. v. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision, 934 F.2d 1127, 
1136-7 (lOth Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 8. Ct. 1475 (1992). 
46. !d. at 1l::l7 (citing Webster's II, New Riverside University Dictionary 
(1988)). 
47. !d. 
48. !d. 
49. !d. at l13R. 
.50. !d. at 1137 (citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 
U.S. 402 (1971)). 
nl. !d. (citing Thompson v. United States Dep't of Labor, 885 F.2d 551 (9th 
Cir. 1989)). 
n2. !d. (citing Animal Defense Council v. Hodel, 867 F.2d 1244 (9th Cir. 1989)). 
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direct proof, but merely a "belief held with confidence".53 
Due process requires more. 
The Tenth Circuit went on to find that the administra-
tive record was sufficiently voluminous to enable a mean-
ingful review of the agency's actions. It found that the trial 
court erred in its determination that the record was incom-
plete, and found that even if it were, the "appropriate rem-
edy for this defect would have been for the trial court to 
call for any missing documents or require Director to testify 
or provide further explanation."54 The court of appeals held 
further that a district court should confine its review to the 
information before the director at the time he decides to 
appoint a conservator, and that the director has an obliga-
tion to produce for the district court only the information 
"that he relied upon in making his decision."55 
The court looked to decisions in the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth56 and Eighth57 Circuits, which 
concluded that the "upon the merits" language does not set 
a standard of review, and that the de novo standard is 
inappropriate in these cases.58 
The Fifth Circuit came to this conclusion after finding 
that "the absence of pre-deprivation process heightens the 
need for post-deprivation procedures . . . "59 and that 
while the private interests involved were important, they 
were "subordinate to those of the government."60 The Fifth 
Circuit reasoned that the arbitrary and capricious standard, 
as applied to the administrative record alone, was sufficient 
post-deprivation process to meet due process requirements. 
Such review comes dangerously close to allowing the director 
unfettered discretion and removing any semblance of due 
53. ld. (citing Webster's II, New Riverside University Dictionary (1988)). 
54. ld. at 11:19. 
55. ld. at 1140. 
56. Woods v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 826 F.2d 1400 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. 
dented, 485 U.S. 959 (1988). 
57. Guaranty Sav. & Loan Ass'n. v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 794 F.2d 
1339 (8th Cir. 1986). 
58. Woods, 826 F.2d at 1406; Guaranty, 794 F.2d at 1342. Franklin, however, 
docs not argue that a de novo review is appropriate. Indeed, the district court in 
Franklin also held that the arbitrary and capricious standard was appropriate. 
Franklin, 742 F. Supp. at 109fi. It merely found that this standard should be 
applied to more than one side of the case. !d. 
59. Woods, 826 F.2d at 1411. 
60. ld. 
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process. 
The Tenth Circuit found that the district court in 
Franklin had erred in improperly expanding the scope of its 
review. 61 The Tenth Circuit went on, however, to agree 
with the arbitrary and capricious standard of review used 
by the district court. 62 The court then followed the Fifth 
Circuit ruling and applied the arbitrary and capricious 
standard to the limited administrative record, and upheld 
the OTS' appointment of a conservator. The Tenth Circuit's 
factual findings, utilizing the administrative record alone, 
were in strong contrast to those of the district court which 
relied on a great deal of testimony and outside evidence.63 
The Tenth Circuit ignored Franklin's challenge to the 
deprivation of meaningful post-deprivation process, finding 
that the "availability of this post-deprivation hearing pre-
cludes any due process violations."64 A hearing examining 
only one side of the record seems to be sufficiently mean-
ingful for the Tenth Circuit's due process analysis. 
D. Petition for Writ 
In response to the Tenth Circuit decision, Franklin 
Savings filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Su-
preme Court. This petition was denied.65 Due to the consti-
tutional implications, the issues raised by this petition merit 
review and analysis. 
III. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION 
A. "Upon the Merits" 
The issue of what constitutes a review "upon the mer-
its" in examining OTS seizure decisions under 12 U.S.C. § 
1464(d)(2)(E) (Supp. 1992) can be addressed through an 
analysis of both prior case law and statutory construction. 
61. Franklin Savings Ass'n. v. Director nf Office of Thrift Supervision, 742 F. 
Supp. 1089, 1140 (D. Kan. 1990), rf'v'd, 9;14 F.2d 1127 (lOth Cir. 1991), cert. de-
nied, 112 S. Ct. 1475 (1992). 
62. !d. at 1127. 
63. Franklin, 742 F. Supp. at 1099-1124; Franklin, 9:14 F.2d at 1143-1149. 
64. Franklin, 934 F.2d at 1140. 
6.'i. 112 S. Ct. 147.'i (1992). 
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1. Lower court cases 
Several courts have addressed the "upon the merits" 
issue. The first, Collie v. Federal Home Loan Bank 
Board,66 was relied upon by the lower court in Franklin. 
In Collie, suit was brought against the Federal Home Loan 
Bank Board under a statute substantially identical to the 
one in question in Franklin. The court addressed the "upon 
the merits" language and reached the following conclusion: 
First, [upon the merits] means that the court should be 
satisfied that the association has had a meaningful oppor-
tunity to make a case in opposition to the appointment of 
a receiver at some point during the process leading to the 
appointment. If it has not, then the court should provide 
that opportunity. If it has, however, the court need not 
offer another. 
Secondly, the Board should be able to show a reason-
able factual basis for its action. 67 
In another case, Marietta Franklin Sec. Co. v. 
Muldoon,68 the court applied the arbitrary and capricious 
standard of review, and took a middle ground approach to 
the expansiveness of the evidence to be heard. It decided 
that "upon the merits" required something between a full 
evidentiary hearing and a mere perusal of the administra-
tive record. 69 Accordingly, it allowed the parties to supple-
ment the administrative record "to the extent that said 
supplementation would augment or clarify the Administra-
tive Record to reflect evidence the Director had before him 
at the time of making his decision."70 
The Marietta court specifically rejected the same Su-
preme Court precedents used by the Tenth Circuit to over-
turn the Franklin decision. 71 The Marietta court reasoned 
that those Supreme Court precedents do not establish the 
rule that a review "upon the merits" means a review of the 
66. 642 F. Supp. 1147 (N.D. Ill. 1986). 
67. I d. at 1152. 
68. 770 F. Supp. 1212 (S.D. Ohio 1991). 
69. Id. at 1220-21. 
70. Id. at 1221. 
71. Woods v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 826 F.2d 1400 (fith Cir. 1987), cert. 
denied, 48fi U.S. 9.'i9 (1988); Guaranty Sav. & Loan Ass'n. v. Federal Home Loan 
Bank Bd., 794 F.2d 1:189 (8th Cir. 1986). 
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administrative record as submitted by the agency and that 
alone. They simply state that a de novo review is improper 
in cases where a court is reviewing S&L seizures.72 In voic-
ing a plea for uniformity, the Marietta court stated: 
It has also become readily apparent that a uniform 
resolution is needed for these statutory sections. To the 
extent that this Country continues to face more and more 
failed savings associations, more and more challenges to 
the appointment of receivers, or conservators will be main-
tained .... To have such a range of disagreement as to 
what standard should be applied in reviewing the record is 
unproductive. The review accorded a saving association's 
challenge to the appointment of a receiver or conservator 
should be uniform and consistent. The review afforded the 
challenging association should not be predicated upon 
where the association happens to be located or where they 
happen to bring suit.73 
Another case, brought in the District Court for the 
District of Columbia, the alternative statutory venue for § 
1462(d)(2)(E) actions, reached a similar conclusion. In Lin-
coln Savings & Loan Ass'n. v. Wall, 74 the court applied the 
usual arbitrary and capricious standard of review, but also 
stated that "the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution and 
the statutory language 'upon the merits' require the review-
ing Court to undertake a level of inquiry beyond a simple 
review of the administrative record."75 The court then pro-
ceeded to an evidentiary hearing lasting some twenty-nine 
days. 76 A similar conclusion was reached previously in the 
same district, 77 and in other district courts. 78 
Relying heavily on the Tenth Circuit's decision in 
Franklin, another D.C. district court later found that the 
"upon the merits" language limits the scope of review to the 
administrative record. The court found that the "upon the 
72. Marietta, 770 F. Supp. at 1221-22. 
73. !d. at 1221 n.R. 
74. 743 F. Supp. 901 (D.D.C. 1990). 
75. !d. at 904 n.3. 
76. !d. 
77. Haralson v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 721 F. Supp. 1344 (D.D.C. 
1989). 
78. See San Marino Sav. & Loan Ass'n. v. Washington Fed. Sav., 605 F. Supp. 
502 (C.D. Cal. 19R4); Washington Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n. v. Federal Home Loan 
Bank Bd., 526 F. Supp. 343 (N.D. Ohio 1981). 
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merits" language "merely means that the district court's 
decision to either dismiss the action or remove the appoint-
ed receiver should be based upon the merits of the action 
(i.e. whether statutory grounds for a receiver exist) rather 
than on procedural or policy oriented grounds."79 This anal-
ysis rewrites the statute so that it reads "upon the record" 
instead of "upon the merits." The clear meaning of the stat-
utory scheme is written out of the text. 
In order to avoid this misinterpretation, some courts 
have gone to the other extreme and interpreted the "upon 
the merits" language as requiring de novo review. In Tele-
graph Savings & Loan Ass'n. v. Federal Savings & Loan 
Ins. Corp.,80 the court stated: "In defining our proceeding 
as one 'upon the merits' rather than one 'on the record,' the 
statute seems to require not an appellate-type proceeding 
but rather an exercise of this court's de novo jurisdic-
tion."81 The court went on to state that "providing an asso-
ciation with anything less than an adversarial hearing in 
the wake of an ex parte seizure offends the principles of 
due process."82 
Similarly, in Fidelity Savings and Loan v. Federal Home 
Loan Bank Board, 83 the court found that the phrase "upon 
the merits" "necessarily implies that the court's power to re-
view the FHLBB's determination is not bound by the nor-
mal limitations applicable to an administrative review of an 
agency's previous adjudication."84 The court continued, "If it 
means nothing more, the term 'upon the merits' reveals that 
a proceeding under this statute is more in the nature of a 
de novo review than an appellate review."85 
2. Statutory construction 
The rules of statutory construction also lead to a con-
79. Gibraltar Sav. v. Ryan, 772 F. Supp. 1290, 1293 (D.D.C. 1991) (citing 
Guaranty Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 794 F.2d 13:39, 
1342 (8th Cir. 1986)). 
80. 564 F. Supp. 862 (N.D. Ill. 1981), a{fd sub. nom. Telegraph Sav. & Loan 
Ass'n v. Schilling, 708 F.2d 1019 (7th Cir. 1983). 
81. !d. at 869. 
82. Id. 
83. fi40 F. Supp. 1:374 (N.D. Cal.), rev'd on other wounds, 689 F.2d 803 (9th 
Cir. 1982). 
84. Id. at B77. 
85. Id. 
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elusion that Congress intended review "upon the merits" to 
mean something other than "on the record." First, the Su-
preme Court has held that whenever possible, statutes 
should be construed to avoid constitutional problems.86 Al-
lowing "upon the merits" to take on a meaning which fails 
to provide closed savings institutions with an opportunity for 
a meaningful hearing, either prior to or subsequent to the 
deprivation, leads to serious due process difficulties.87 
In addition, when Congress intends a review "on the 
record," it traditionally indicates that intention "either ex-
pressly or by use of a term like 'substantial evidence,' which 
has 'become a term of art to describe the basis on which an 
administrative record is to be judged by a reviewing 
court."'88 In this case, Congress chose terms which, on 
their face, indicate more than a review of the record alone. 
The term "upon the merits" indicates a judicial inquiry into 
the merits of the entire case, not a superficial glance at one 
side of the case. 
When Congress intends merely a review of the record, 
rather than additional fact-finding, it generally gives juris-
diction to a federal circuit court rather than to a federal 
district court.89 In fact, it did so in another area of 
FIRREA. When a holding company appeals an action taken 
under 12 U.S.C. § 1467a(j), such review takes place in the 
court of appeals, and the review is "on the record".90 That 
Congress knew how to provide for review "on the record" 
and chose not to should go far to show its intent in using 
the "upon the merits" language. 
Furthermore, allowing the review to go beyond the re-
cord does not hinder the Congressional intent that the ap-
86. Sr>e Edward J. De Bartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. 
Trades Council, 48fi U.S. 568 (1989); Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry., 466 U.S. 43fi 
(1984). 
87. Franklin Savings Ass'n. v. Director of Office of Thrift Supervision, 742 F. 
Supp. 1089, 1126-27 (D. Kan. 1990), rev'd, 934 F.2d 1127 (lOth Cir. 1991), cert. 
dmied, 112 S. Ct. 1475 (1992). 
88. Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840, 862 n.37 (1976) (quoting United 
States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co., 373 U.S. 709, 715 (1963)). 
89. See McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 111 S. Ct. 888 (1991); Florida 
Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729 (1985); Washington Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 526 F. Supp. 343 (N.D. Ohio 1981). 
90. 12 U.S.C. § 1467a(j) (Supp. 1992); Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. 
§ 5fi4(a) (1977). 
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pointment of a conservator be swift and immediate,9J smce 
such review takes place while the conservator, not the pnor 
administration, is operating the institution. 
By granting jurisdiction to the district court, and by 
specifying a review "upon the merits", Congress clearly in-
dicated an intent that judicial review under § 1646(d)(2)(E) 
be something more than "on the record". The Tenth Circuit 
has not followed this intent, and since the Supreme Court 
has declined to hear the case, Congress must once again 
clarify its intent. 
B. The ((Designated Record" 
The Tenth Circuit also found that "[ w ]hile the director 
has an obligation to produce for judicial review a designated 
administrative record, such record does not have to be need-
lessly elaborate, nor as detailed as the district court here 
required."92 The court reasoned that the Director need sub-
mit only "sufficient data to allow the reviewing court to 
determine whether the director had a rational basis for the 
appointment decision."93 
This analysis is clearly contrary to prior Supreme Court 
precedent. In fact, the Supreme Court has stated that re-
view of the administrative record "is to be based on the full 
administrative record that was before the secretary at the 
time he made his decision."94 The Supreme Court has fur-
ther held that "the bare record may not disclose the factors 
that were considered or the Secretary's construction of the 
evidence .... "95 The record to be considered is the "whole 
record,"96 and not merely evidence "which in and of itself 
justified [such action], without taking into account contradic-
tory evidence or evidence from which conflicting inferences 
could be drawn . . . ."97 
The Ninth Circuit has followed this line of reasoning 
and held that "[t]he whole administrative record, however, 
91. See Franklin, 742 F. Supp. at 1097; Franklin, 934 F.2d at 11:17. 
92. Franklin, 934 F.2d at 1139. 
93. !d. 
94. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971). 
95. !d. 
96. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951). See also 
Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1977) ("In making the foregoing 
determinations, the court shall review the whole record ... . ") (emphasis added). 
97. Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 487. 
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'is not necessarily those documents that the agency has 
compiled and submitted as 'the' administrative record . 
The 'whole' administrative record, therefore, consists of all 
documents and materials directly or indirectly considered by 
agency decision-makers and includes evidence contrary to 
the agency's position."'98 Other circuits have also followed 
this line of reasoning,99 which the Tenth Circuit seems to 
have avoided, thus allowing the OTS to provide a one-sided 
basis for reviewing any conservatorship appointment. The 
Tenth Circuit has created a due process dragon that Con-
gress did not intend to create. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE ISSUES 
The scope and importance of these issues cannot be 
overemphasized. They affect not only the savings and loan 
industry, but also the entire banking industry, since there 
are corresponding provisions affecting commercial banks. 100 
Although the banking industry has not experienced conser-
vatorship to the same extent that the savings and loan 
industry has, there are indications that this may change in 
the near future. 101 Accordingly, an interpretation of the 
"upon the merits" language of the savings and loan provi-
sions would be persuasive in application to banking regula-
tions as well. 
V. CONCLUSION 
It is clear that Congress intended "upon the merits" to 
mean something other than "on the record." It is also clear 
that there is a serious lack of uniformity among the courts 
as to the scope of a review "upon the merits." The Tenth 
98. Thompson v. United States Dep't of Labor, 885 F.2d 551, 555 (9th Cir. 
1989) (citation omitted) (quoting Exxon Corp. v. United States Dep't of Energy, 91 
F.R.D. 26, 32-33 (N.D. Tex. 1981)). 
99. See, e.g., Public Power Council v. Johnson, 674 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1982); 
Dopico v. Goldschmidt, 687 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1982); Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc. v. Train, fi19 F.2d 287 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Appalachian Power Co. v. 
EPA, 477 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1973). 
100. Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § .Sfi4(a) (1977); 12 U.S.C. § 1821 
(1988). 
101. See Neil Barsky & Kenneth H. Bacon, FDIC Rejects Two Bids for 
Crossland, Puts Up $1.2 Billion of Its Own Capital, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 1992, at 
A5. 
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Circuit's decision in Franklin imposes a serious c rivation 
without any opportunity for a meaningful hearing. The in-
creased number of thrift and bank closures and threatened 
future closures magnifies the importance of a proper 
resolution to these issues. 
Without Supreme Court review, the solution to the 
Judiciary's obvious misinterpretation of the "upon the mer-
its" language is simple. Congress should amend the statute 
to more clearly define the phrase and clarify their intent. 
This will allow failed savings and loans their constitutional-
ly guaranteed right to adequately present evidence in their 
defense. 
Grant L. Kratz 
